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Actions in Contract Resulting From
Aircraft Crashes
Stephen M. Feldman*
T HE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE is to examine possible causes of
actions sounding in contract available in cases of death or
personal injuries arising out of aircraft crashes. The ability of
the plaintiff to sustain an action in contract may have a decisive
effect on the outcome of the litigation in any one of the follow-
ing respects: First, as a general rule the law of the place of the
accident governs tort actions, while the law of the place of con-
tracting governs contract actions and for one of several reasons
it may be advantageous to the plaintiff to avoid the law of the
place of the accident; the place of the accident may impose a
monetary limitation on the amount recoverable for wrongful
death; the place of the accident may have a shorter period of
limitations than the place of contracting; the place of the accident
may grant only a survival action and not an action for wrong-
ful death, while the place of the contract allows both. Second,
the sustaining of an action in contract may be a means of avoid-
ing the need to prove negligence.
Since general principles of personal injury govern aircraft
accidents, much of what is said here might be applied generally
to personal injuries but there can be little doubt that aviation,
because of its own uniqueness, has developed a somewhat unique
body of law. This is particularly true in relation to choice of
law problems, for only in aviation accidents can the place of the
accident be completely fortuitous, as when an aircraft is blown
off course in a storm and crashes in a jurisdiction over which
the plane was not scheduled to fly.
Actions Against the Airline
The advantage to be gained by a plaintiff from an action in
contract against the airline for the injury or death of a passenger
on an international flight which is covered by the Warsaw Con-
vention' is considerably more limited than in cases not within
* B.A., LL.B., University of Pennsylvania; Member of the law firm of Feld-
man, Feldman & Feldman of Philadelphia; etc.
I The Warsaw Convention is formally entitled "Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation By Air." It
(Continued on next page)
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the Convention. The Convention provides for liability of the air-
line without proof of negligence where death or injury takes
place on board the aircraft2 unless the airline proves that it has
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage.3 However, the
amount of recovery is limited to 125,000 francs (about $8,300) 4
unless it is proved that the damage was caused by the wilful mis-
conduct of the airline. 5 The Convention specifically provides that
any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought
subject to the conditions and limits set out in the Convention.,
Thus, regardless of whether the plaintiff's action be founded in
tort or contract, he would be required to prove wilful miscon-
duct 7 on the part of the airline to be entitled to collect an amount
in excess of $8,300, and would not have to prove even negligence
to collect up to $8,300.
However the situation with regard to the Warsaw Conven-
tion is considerably more complicated than may at first appear.
Despite the fact that Article 17 of the Convention appears on its
face to create a cause of action for the injury or wrongful death
of passengers, it has been unequivocally held that neither Article
17 nor any other part of the Convention creates any substan-
tive right of action.8 The plaintiff in a case covered by the Con-
vention must look to some locally created right on which to
found his action. Assuming he can prove wilful misconduct, how
much in excess of $8,300 he is entitled to collect would depend
on whether the applicable local statute creates an action for
wrongful death, a survival action or both, and whether there is
included in the statute a monetary limitation. If the local mone-
(Continued from preceding page)
was concluded at an international convention at Warsaw, Poland, in 1929,
and was adhered to by the United States upon the advice of the Senate in
1934. It is set forth at 49 Stat. 3000 et seq. (1934). Article 1 defines the ap-
plicability of the Convention, which is basically to international flights be-
tween nations adhering to the Convention.
2 Warsaw Convention, Article 17, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934).
3 Warsaw Convention, Article 20, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934).
4 Warsaw Convention, Article 22, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934).
5 Warsaw Convention, Article 25, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934).
6 Warsaw Convention, Article 24, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934).
7 For a definition of wilful misconduct as used in the Warsaw Convention,
see Tuller v. Koninklijke Luchvaart Matschappij, 292 F. 2d 775 (D. C. Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 921 (1961).
8 Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 257 F. 2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U. S. 907 (1957).
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tary limitation were deemed a limitation on the right itself it
might apply despite the provisions of the Convention.9
In Warsaw Convention cases, because of the onus of proving
wilful misconduct, it is particularly important for the plaintiff
to consider the liability of the manufacturer, who is not protected
by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention. Because of the
normal absence of control by the manufacturer and consequent
difficulty in establishing negligence on a res ipsa loquitur theory,
the plaintiff should consider the question of manufacturers' war-
ranties.
A Common Carrier Makes No Implied Warranty of Safe
Carriage
Although some early cases speak of a warranty of safe car-
riage made by a common carrier to its passengers, 10 it seems
clear that common carriers are not liable under such a theory. In
Stokes v. Saltonstall," the Supreme Court of the United States
held:
We think that the Court laid down the law correctly in each
and all of these instructions. It is certainly a sound principle
that a contract to carry passengers differs from a contract
to carry goods. For the goods, the carrier is answerable, at
all events, except the act of God, and the public enemy.
But although he does not warrant the safety of the pas-
sengers, at all events, yet his undertaking and liability as to
them, go to this extent: that he, or his agent, if, as in this
case, he acts by agent, shall possess competent skill; and
that as far as human care and foresight can go, he will
transport them safely.
Although modern aviation cases have added considerable im-
petus to the argument that the carrier warrants the safe carriage
of the passenger, the argument has been generally rejected. 12
9 cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N. Y. 2d 34, 211 N. Y. S. 2d 133 (1961).
10 See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Thompson, 211 F. 889 (4th Cir. 1914);
Dike v. Erie Railway Co., 45 N. Y. 113 (1871); Sullivan v. Phila. & Reading
R. R. Co., 30 Pa. 234 (1858).
11 13 Pet. 181, 191 (1839).
12 Maynard v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 178 F. 2d 139, 13 A. L. R. 2d 646 (2d
Cir. 1949); Herman v. Eastern Airlines, 149 F. Supp. 417 (S. D. N. Y. 1957);
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra, note 9; Faron v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 193 Misc. 395, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 568 (1948).
Note: In Kilberg the New York Court of Appeals suggested that an action
in contract might exist under the law of New York as the locus contractus
if the breach of contract for safe carriage had not resulted in death.
Sept., 1963
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Express Warranty Arising From Airline Advertising
Many airlines advertise safety features they offer. For ex-
ample, one line advertises that it has more experience than any
other airline and that its crews have been trained to the world's
highest flight standards, and another line advertises that all its
aircraft are equipped with radar. To hold that such advertising,
if it induces a person to purchase a ticket on that airline, amounts
to an express warranty that the flight crews have been trained
to the world's highest standards or that the aircraft are equipped
with radar, is a logical step from the line of decisions dealing
with advertising promises connected with the sale of a product.
In Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.,13 the highest court of
Ohio held:
Today, many manufacturers of merchandise, including the
defendant herein, make extensive use of newspapers, periodi-
cals, signboards, radio and television to advertise their prod-
ucts. The worth, quality and benefits of these products are
described in glowing terms and in considerable detail, and
the appeal is almost universally directed to the ultimate con-
sumer .... What sensible or sound reason then exists as
to why, when the goods purchased by the ultimate con-
sumer on the strength of the advertisements aimed squarely
at him do not possess their described qualities and goodness
and cause him harm, he should not be permitted to move
against the manufacturer to recoup his loss. In our minds no
good or valid reason exists for denying him that right. Surely
under modern merchandising practices the manufacturer
owes a very real obligation toward those who consume or use
his products. The warranties made by the labels on his prod-
ucts are inducements to the ultimate consumer, and the man-
ufacturer ought to be held to strict accountability to any con-
sumer who buys the product in reliance on such representa-
tions and later suffers injury because the product proves to
be defective or deleterious.
The cause of action by the passenger for breach of express
warranties contained in advertising should be even more firmly
entrenched in our theories of jurisprudence. First, privity of
contract clearly exists in the passenger-carrier case but is usually
absent in the consumer-manufacturer case. Second, it has long
been the rule of the common law that a common carrier owes its
passengers the highest degree of care. By way of contrast, sales
13 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N. E. 2d 612, 615-616 (1958). See also Randy Knit-
wear v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N. Y. 2d 5, 226 N. Y. S. 2d 363, 181 N. E.
2d 399 (1962); Harmon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A. 2d 294 (1961).
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warranties developed in a field where caveat emptor was the
rule as to a person in privity with the manufacturer. Liability
did not exist even where there was negligence as to a person
not in privity.
Regardless of what question may exist as to the choice of
law rule applicable to an implied warranty 14 imposed on a manu-
facturer or seller by operation of law, the law of the place of
contract should govern an express warranty, for it is in a true
sense a contractual duty voluntarily assumed by the airline.
Thus, an action for breach of express warranties contained in ad-
vertising, where supported by the facts, may provide a means of
avoiding the law of the place of the accident.
Actions Against the Aircraft Manufacturer
I. Implied Warrants of Quality
Naturally an airline passenger is not in privity of contract
with the aircraft manufacturer. Therefore, the pivotal question
in a suit against an aircraft manufacturer for the death or in-
jury of a passenger for breach of implied warranty frequently is
whether such warranty exists despite the absence of privity.
Historically the action for breach of warranty had its origins
in the law of torts, and it was not until the end of the Eighteenth
Century that the first such action was brought in contract.15
The reasons for the rise of the requirement of privity in con-
nection with implied warranties is obscure, but whatever the
reason it seems to have been founded more on accident than
logic.16
The earlier cases in the general movement away from the
requirement of privity based their reasoning on some fictitious
theory within the realm of contracts. For example some cases
talked of the injured party as a third party beneficiary of the
contract of sale; 17 others talked of a theoretical assignment of
14 See the discussion, infra, of the choice of law rules applicable to the
manufacturer's implied warranties.
15 Prosser, Law of Torts 493 (2d ed. 1955).
16 Compare the accidental growth of a requirement of privity in negligence
cases beginning with Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 11 L. J. Ex.
415 (1842), and culminating with Justice Cardozo's classic opinion in Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916). Compare
also the development and fall of the privity requirement in actions for
breach of warranty of seaworthiness, culminating in Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (1946).
17 Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928);
Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P. 2d 833 (1938).
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the warranty; I and yet others talked of the person in privity as
a theoretical agent of the injured person.19 Today those same
courts find no difficulty in saying that a warranty action is tor-
tious in nature and public policy demands the manufacturer
be held liable irrespective of privity.20
In some states the development of the exception to the
privity requirement depended on the type of product involved.
The law of Kansas presents an excellent example of this develop-
ment. The exception under Kansas law was originally limited
to food cases. It was then by steps extended to include a food
container, 21 cosmetics, 22 and finally products which if defectively
made will be dangerous. 23 Some states today require privity in
all but food cases.24
In the face of the muddled and rapidly changing state of the
law with regard to privity, there is a rapidly increasing body of
cases dealing with the rights of an airline passenger to sue the
aircraft manufacturer for breach of implied warranty, some
cases holding privity required 25 and others not.26
18 Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90
S. W. 2d 445 (1936).
19 Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 P. 1050 (1929);
Grinell v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 282 Mich. 509, 276 N. W. 535
(1937).
20 See Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., supra, note 13; Peterson v.
Lamb Rubber Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P. 2d 575 (1960); Worley v. Procter &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S. W. 2d 532 (1952); Freeman v.
Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 760, 289 P. 2d 1015 (1955); Spence v. Three Rivers
Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N. W. 2d 873 (1958).
21 Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kans. 613, 258 P. 2d 317 (1953).
22 Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kans. 68, 269 P. 2d 413 (1954).
23 B. F. Goodrich v. Hammond, 269 F. 2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
24 Harris v. Hampton Roads Tractor & Equipment Co., 202 Va. 958, 121 S. E.
2d 471 (1961).
25 Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F. 2d 602 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. de-
nied, 358 U. S. 910 (1958); State of Md. for the use of McClanan v. Brantley
Helicopter Corp., 7 CCH Avi. 17,471 (E. D. Pa. 1961); Goldberg v. American
Airlines, Inc., 23 Misc. 2d 215, 199 N. Y. S. 2d 134 (1960); Egan v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 7 CCH Avi. 17,292 (Supreme Ct., Kings County, N. Y.
1961).
26 Conlon v. Republic Aviation Corp., 204 F. Supp. 865 (S. D. N. Y. 1960);
Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S. D. N. Y. 1960); Middle-
ton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S. D. N. Y. 1960); Ewing v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962); Hinton v. Re-
public Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S. D. N. Y. 1959); Garon v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp., 7 CCH Avi. 17,418 (Calif. Super. Ct., L. A. County
1961).
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Certain factual circumstances surrounding the relationship of
the aircraft manufacturer to the airline passenger bear analysis
in determining the existence of a warranty. First, although there
is a certain amount of advertising by the aircraft manufacturer,
it is limited and obviously different from the high pressure ad-
vertisements of food or cosmetic manufacturers. Second, the
average airline passenger pays little attention to the manufac-
turer of the aircraft on which he will fly, except perhaps to in-
quire if the plane is a jet. To the extent that the passenger re-
lies on anyone, he undoubtedly relies on the airline and not the
manufacturer. Third, the passenger is not a buyer of the air-
craft, and thus is one step further removed from the traditional
remedy for breach of implied warranty than even the buyer of
the product who, because he bought from a retailer, lacks privity
with the manufacturer. The remedies for breach of warranty
enumerated in Section 69 of the Uniform Sales Act are all reme-
dies of the "buyer." It is not suggested in the Act that someone
in the position of a temporary user of a product has any remedy
for breach of warranty.
In Chapman v. Brown,27 the United States District Court
held that under Hawaii law there exists, in addition to those
implied warranties in the Uniform Sales Act, a common law im-
plied warranty that extends to the user of products, regardless
of privity, where the goods sold constitute a dangerous instru-
mentality. The reasoning of this opinion is most apposite in
aviation cases. In addition to the policies that favor imposing
implied warranties on manufacturers, in this country at least,
strict governmental regulation of aircraft manufacture provides
an additional policy reason for imposing such warranties on air-
craft manufacturers.
II. The Choice of Law Rule
In addition to the usual considerations that exist with regard
to choice of laws, in warranty cases the choice of law may de-
termine the very existence of the right of action, for the law of
one state may require privity of contract and the law of another
state may not require it.
The choice of laws rules which could conceivably be ap-
plied to a breach of implied warranty are as follows:
27 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd 304 F. 2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
Sept., 1963
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1. The law of the place of the sale. 2s This rule may be diffi-
cult of application, as where a warranty is asserted against an
engine manufacturer who sold the engine in state x to the air-
craft manufacturer who in turn sold the aircraft with the engine
assembled into it to the airline.
2. The law of the place of performance of the contract.2 9
3. The law of the place of the accident.30
4. The law of the place of the most significant contacts.
31
There is an interesting dearth of textual material on the
question of the choice of law rule to be applied to breaches of
implied warranties of fitness. The Restatement of Conflict of
Laws does not make any special mention of breaches of war-
ranty, apparently assuming that they will be treated under either
the contract rule or the tort rule as a matter of course.
There is a divergence in the cases as to what choice of law
rule should be applied to a manufacturer's breach of implied war-
ranties of fitness. However, a careful analysis of the nature of
the breach of implied warranty action leads inevitably to the con-
clusion that regardless of the contract language which has at-
tached to the action, its true nature is tortious, and the choice of
law rule to be applied should be the same as in a negligence ac-
tion:
1. Historically the action for breach of warranty originated
in tort and it was not until 1778 that the first decision was re-
ported in which breach of warranty was pursued in contract. 32
2. Liability for breach of contract arises because of the vol-
untary manifestations of the parties to the contract, while li-
ability in tort is imposed by the law in furtherance of social
policy completely irrespective of the intention of the parties. 33
The action for breach of implied warranty falls in the latter
class. 34
28 Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., supra, note 25; Texas Motorcoaches v.
A. C. F. Motors Co., 154 F. 2d 91 (3rd Cir. 1946).
29 See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 358.
30 Conlon v. Republic Aviation Corp., supra, note 26; State of Md. for the
use of McClanan v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., supra, note 25.
31 Bowles v. Zimmer Manufacturing Co., 277 F. 2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960); Noel
v. United Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1962).
32 Prosser, Law of Torts 493 (2d ed. 1955).
33 See Ibid., 478 (2d ed. 1955).
34 Id. at 493.
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3. The measure of damages in actions for breach of contracts
is that expressed in the classic English case Hadley v. Baxen-
dale,3 5 to be those damages that could have been fairly and rea-
sonably contemplated by both the parties when they made the
contract.3 6 On the other hand, the tort rule is that the plaintiff
may recover for all damages proximately caused by defendant's
conduct.37 If the contract rule of damages were applied in ac-
tions for breach of implied warranty, the plaintiff would not be
entitled to collect for an aggravation of a pre-existing medical
condition, of which the defendant neither knew nor had reason
to know. But universally the courts have applied the broader
tort measure of damages in breach of warranty actions. 38
Normally damages will not be allowed for mental suffering
in actions for breach of contract,3 9 but will be allowed in tort
actions. 40 The rule in breach of warranty actions follows the tort
rule, allowing damages for emotional distress.4 1
4. The tort rather than the longer contract period of limita-
tions has been applied to breach of warranty actions.42
5. Contributory negligence has generally been held to be a
defense to actions for breach of warranty.43
6. In one case involving a breach of warranty the defendant
sought to avoid liability on the ground that the contract, having
been made on Sunday, was illegal, and therefore should not be
enforced by the court. However, the court refused to apply this
purely contract concept to the action.44
35 9 Exch. 341 (1854).
36 See Chief Justice Cardozo's opinion in Kerr S. S. Co., Inc. v. Radio Cor-
poration of America, 245 N. Y. 284, 157 N. E. 140 (1927).
37 Restatement, Torts § 435.
38 See Worstel v. Stern Brothers, 3 Misc. 2d 848, 156 N. Y. S. 2d 335 (Su-
preme Ct. Kings County 1956), in which the seller of a bed was held liable
for an aggravation of a pre-existing heart condition when a leg of the bed
collapsed; and Medieros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Turlock, Ltd., 135 P.
2d 676 (Cal. App. 1943), in which damages were allowed for aggravation of
plaintiff's pre-existing ulcer condition resulting from an impurity in a
Coca-Cola.
39 Restatement, Contracts § 341.
40 Restatement, Torts § 924 (a).
41 See Hamilton Corp. v. O'Neill, 273 F. 2d 89 (D. C. Cir. 1959).
42 Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P. 2d 163 (1954);
Jones v. Boggs & Buhl, Inc., 355 Pa. 242, 49 A. 2d 379 (1946); Schlick v. New
York Dugan Bros., Inc., 175 Misc. 182, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (City Ct. of N. Y.,
Kings County 1940).
43 Siebrand v. Eyerly Aircraft Co., 196 F. Supp. 936 (D. Ore. 1961).
44 Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N. W. 48 (1937).
Sept., 1963
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7. Interest is generally allowed in contract actions from the
date performance was due45 but is not allowed in tort actions.46
It seems clear that breach of warranty actions would fall in the
latter category.
Actions Against Independent Repair Agencies
It is not uncommon for airlines to employ an independent
contractor to repair or overhaul various parts of the aircraft,
and a plaintiff in a case of improper repair or overhaul can look
to the repairman for liability. However, the law with regard to
repairmen has developed somewhat more slowly than that of
manufacturers. The case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
47
dealt with the liability of manufacturers according to its facts.
Although some courts were reluctant to extend the theory of
MacPherson to repairmen, it is now generally accepted that the
law has been so extended.48
There is little if any talk of an implied warranty of proper
repair made by a repairman, but most of the policies of the law
which led to the imposition of this form of liability on the manu-
facturer exist with regard to the repairman.
In the recent case of Evans v. Otis Elevator Co.,49 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held:
Generally a party to a contract does not become liable for
a breach thereof to one who is not a party thereto. However,
a party to a contract by the very nature of his contractual
undertaking may place himself in such a position that the law
will impose upon him a duty to perform his contractual
undertaking in such manner that third persons-strangers
to the contract-will not be injured thereby; Prosser, Torts,
(2nd ed. 1955), . 85, pp. 514-519. It is not the contract per
se which creates the duty; it is the law which imposes the
duty because of the nature of the undertaking in the con-
tract. If a person undertakes by contract to make periodic
examinations and inspections of equipment, such as eleva-
tors, be should reasonably foresee that a normal and natural
result of his failure to properly perform such undertaking
might result in injury not only to the owner of the equipment
but also third persons, including the owner's employees:
45 Restatement, Contracts § 337.
46 Restatement, Torts § 913.
47 Supra, note 16.
48 See Restatement, Torts §§ 403, 404 (1934).
49 403 Pa. 13, 18-19, 168 A. 2d 573 (1961).
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Bollin v. Elevator Construction & Repair Co., 361 Pa. 7, 17,
18, 63 A. 2d 19 and cases therein cited. The orbit of Otis'
duty to third persons is measured by the nature and scope
of his contractual undertaking with Sperling and, if, as pres-
ently appears, Otis undertook to inspect the elevator at
regular intervals, and, if the elevator was in a defective or
dangerous condition discoverable by reasonable inspection,
Otis would be liable to third persons, regardless of any priv-
ity of contract, who might be injured by Otis' failure to
properly perform its contractual undertaking of inspection.
Such principle finds support in reason, justice and prece-
dent.
Conclusion
It seems like a step backward for the law again to become
preoccupied with the form of actions. The two concerns of
plaintiffs asserting actions in contract for death or injuries arising
out of aircraft crashes are choice of laws and avoidance of the
need of proving negligence. As to choice of laws there is an in-
creasing movement, which originated in contracts and has moved
into torts,5 0 toward a center of gravity theory, applying the law
of the place having the most predominant contacts with the op-
erative facts of the case. If the center of gravity theory is applied
in the case of an aircraft crash, it would make no difference
whether the action were treated as one in contract or one in tort,
for the place of the sale of the ticket and the place of the crash
would be factors to weigh in determining the center of gravity
under either form of action.51 The application of the center of
gravity theory of choice of laws probably makes more sense in
aircraft crash cases than in any other type of personal injury case,
because it provides a means for avoiding the completely fortui-
tous consequences of a crash in a jurisdiction, the application of
the law of which the parties never contemplated.
As to the factor of avoiding the need to prove negligence,
certain negligence theories such as failure to warn5 2 and res
50 On May 25, 1963, the American Law Institute approved Restatement,
Conflict of Laws § 379 (Second Tentative Draft No. 8, 1963), replacing the
strict orthodox rule of lex loci delicti with a rule applying "The local law
of the state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence
and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort."
51 See Bowles v. Zimmer Manufacturing Co., supra, note 31, where the court
applied the local law of the state most closely associated with the trans-
action in a case involving implied warranty.
52 See Restatement, Torts § 388 (1934).
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ipsa loquitur may provide the plaintiff with all the advantages
that an action in contract would provide. For example, in Hop-
kins v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.,5 3 the court sustained the
plaintiff's theory of liability against a dynamite manufacturer for
failure to warn of the danger of premature explosion when dyna-
mite is inserted in holes recently drilled in particularly hard
rock. The plaintiff had admitted that there was nothing defec-
tive about the dynamite. Thus, the defendant had breached no
warranties but had been negligent in failing to warn.
Therefore, by development of the center of gravity theory
of choice of law and such theories of negligence as res ipsa
loquitur, where control in the defendant is not absolute, the law
can obtain sensible and just results without forcing advocates to
resort to a battle of pleading, reminiscent of days gone by.
53 199 F. 2d 930 (3rd Cir. 1952).
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